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Abstract
The advantage of collecting data provenance information has driven research
on how to extend or modify applications and systems in order to provide it, or
the creation of architectures that are built from the ground up with provenance
capabilities. In this paper we propose a universal data provenance framework,
using dynamic instrumentation, which gathers data provenance information for
real-world applications without any code modifications. Our framework simplifies
the task of finding the right points to instrument, which can be cumbersome in
large and complex systems. We have built a proof-of-concept implementation
of the framework on top of DTrace. Moreover, we evaluated its functionality by
using it for three different scenarios: file-system operations, database transactions
and web browser HTTP requests. Based on our experiences we believe that it is
possible to provide data provenance, transparently, to any layer of the software
stack.
1 Introduction
All systems occasionally store their activity in log files, a process we usually refer
to as logging. A log file can contain error messages, warnings, and important
information for a user debugging a problem or investigating the condition of a
running process. However, traditional logging is very limited. It lacks of semantic
and critical information related to the internal state of an object. For example, a
log file can hardly represent the state change for a database executing a particular
query. Thus, we seek of tools and technologies that can monitor an object and
collect intrinsic information associated with its internal state. More precisely,
instead of having a collection of log files containing warning and error messages
we are interested in the data provenance information.
Data provenance – describing how an object came to be in its present state
– is an area that has drawn much research attention lately. There is a num-
ber of schemes that have been proposed on how to apply it in practice and in
widely used applications. Some representative provenance schemes have been
proposed for file systems [18], databases [6], web applications [13, 17, 22], cloud
computing [19], smart phone operating systems [8], and web browsers [16]. One
could argue that applying data provenance at a low level, e.g. at the system
call-level, would be sufficient. However, that is not always the case. Applying
data provenance to different layers of the software stack can provide different
levels of information. In the database case, for example, it would be much more
efficient to apply it at the query-level, where all the data, along with any meta-
information (like ownership) is available, than at the system call-level, where one
would get very limited information like I/O operations on file blocks. Also, in the
web browser case, data provenance provided solely at the system-call level will
be unable to capture and record higher-level information. This can be the URLs
the browser renders, in the case the communication channel is over HTTPS. On
the other hand, the function-call level, as provided by OpenSSL [23], has access
to the encrypted data stream used by an HTTPS connection.
By looking at these examples it becomes clear that depending on the case,
data provenance must be provided at the layer closest to the information we
would like to capture and document. This may prove to be a very challenging
task, especially when dealing with large and complex software applications such
as web browsers and databases. For example, Firefox 4 consists of more than 5M
lines of code, spread in almost 40,000 files. In the case of MySQL 5.5, there are
1.2M lines of code, in almost 3,000 files.
In this paper, instead of exploring how we can extend an application to
provide data provenance, we take an alternate route. We propose, and build,
a universal data provenance framework using dynamic instrumentation. The
main goal of our framework is to provide an easy way to prototype any data
provenance scheme, no matter the size and complexity of the system it is applied
on. We argue that lightening the implementation burden of such data provenance
applications would lead research on this field forward, allowing researchers to
test and evaluate their ideas more easily. Our framework is built on dynamic
instrumentation, and especially on DTrace. Its key feature is that it can greatly
assist the user in discovering paths in the system that interesting data pass
through. For example, all URLs and search keywords that flow inside a browser.
After the discovery phase, the user can dynamically instrument these points to
record provenance about this transit data. Moreover, in cases where the source
code of a system is available, our framework could be used for simply discovering
points of interest in the system and evaluating a data provenance application.
Then, prototyping a low-overhead source-code level implementation of the data
provenance application at production level is trivial, as the user knows exactly
which points to instrument in the system.
The choice of dynamic instrumentation for such cases seems ideal as it pro-
vides several advantages. First of all, it requires no changes to the source code of
the system that data provenance capabilities are going to be added in. Second, it
can be easily enabled or disabled, even at runtime in some cases, as we shall see
later on. Finally, it removes the requirement of having the source code, although
having it could be helpful during the discovery phase. On the other hand, the
main disadvantage of dynamic instrumentation is its runtime overhead. However,
this is not an issue in our case as we perform system-call and function-level, but
not instruction-level instrumentation, which can be extremely expensive.
Contribution. The contributions of this paper are the following.
– We deliver a generic instrumentation framework for acquiring information at
the system-call and function-call level. The collected information can reveal
data provenance information.
– We design techniques for easily discovering the important points, which are
associated with particular state changes of a process. For example, our frame-
work can automatically discover the functions that process SQL queries in
SQLite.
– We provide three case studies with real world systems: (a) a file system , (b)
a database (SQLite), and (c) a web browser (Safari).
2 Background
Tracing is the process of observing the execution of a program for collecting
useful information of diagnostic and systemic nature. Various techniques have
been developed for supporting this facility throughout the development cycle as
well as after the deployment of a system. Instrumentation is one such technique
that allows someone to augment the execution of a program with new, user-
provided, code that aids in collecting data for analyzing the behavior of a system.
DTrace is a dynamic instrumentation utility that focuses on production sys-
tems. It allows the instrumentation of both user-level as well as kernel-level code
in a unified and safe manner and has absolutely zero performance cost when
disabled. Initially, DTrace was developed for Sun’s Solaris 10, but it has been in-
tegrated also into Apple’s Mac OS X/Darwin (since 10.5/9) [3], FreeBSD (since
7.1) [9], as well as into other microkernel designs such as QNX (i.e., the Unix-like,
real-time OS for embedded systems) [20]. Moreover, Oracle Linux latest version
included a port of DTrace for Linux [14].
Since the primary focus of DTrace is production systems, it was designed
around two key properties: (a) zero performance cost when disabled and (b)
absolute system safety when enabled. Its dynamic nature allows to be injected
on demand into virtually every place of a running system without suffering from
the performance burden of static “disabled probes”. Systems that support static
instrumentation typically induce some disabled probes overhead. Dynamic in-
strumentation allows truly zero cost, since the probes are dynamically attached
and detached on demand, and hence, they are “absent” when the instrumen-
tation is disabled. User-provided instrumentation code, also known as analysis
code is written in a high-level language, named D, that is subjected to a set of






















Fig. 1. A complex scenario where provenance information from different sources is
combined.
D is C-like but it also resembles AWK [2] a lot in terms of structure. It
has support for all ANSI C operators, it allows access to user- and kernel-level
variables and data structures, and offers dynamic user-defined variables, structs,
unions, and associative arrays. The scoping rules of the language, its intrinsic
data types, as well the program structure are explained in great detail in [5].
The core part of DTrace lies inside the OS kernel and includes all the nec-
essary facilities for providing an infrastructure for dynamic, arbitrary, tracing.
User-level processes become DTrace consumers by communicating with that in-
kernel component and enabling instrumentation. However, the DTrace frame-
work does not perform any instrumentation of the system. This functionality is
provided by the providers; kernel-level parts, typically loadable modules, that
communicate with the core engine using a well-defined API. Providers declare
to DTrace the points that can potentially instrument by providing a callback
function. All in all, DTrace provides merely a skeleton for supporting future in-
strumentation methodologies. Nonetheless, it comes with a set of ready-to-use
providers that have no observable overhead when disabled.
3 Design
The goal of the framework is to extract and gather provenance information re-
lated to the activity of complex systems, such as a web browser or a database.
The collection of information is carried out by monitoring a process at the
system-call and function-call level. This task requires the knowledge of all valid
entry points, where data flows inside the running process. We refer to all sys-
tem and function calls, which process critical information as valid entry points.
For example, a modern web browser, such as Mozilla Firefox, has a function
that processes each input URL. This function is critical, since each processed
URL denotes a semantic transition in the state of the web browser during its
life cycle. The framework is generic enough for allowing information gathering
from multiple valid entry points. The core engine of the framework is based
on DTrace, which gives all low-level primitives for dynamic instrumentation of
running processes. Furthermore, we provide two basic features for reducing the
complexity associated with identifying interesting valid data entries. First, we
provide a highly configurable logging component and, second, we provide assisted
discovery. We now analyze both of these features in detail.
3.1 Configurable Logging
The logging component delivers the core functionality of our framework as it
is responsible for generating provenance information. By default, the compo-
nent monitors all system calls of all running process. For each monitored system
call the following information is collected: (a) system-call arguments, (b) re-
turn value, (c) user id, (d) process name, (e) process id and (f) timestamp. The
component provides an interface where a user can configure which processes
and which system calls are monitored. This component can also be configured
to log library function calls, by specifying the library’s name along with the
name of the function. For example, a security researcher who wants to mon-
itor all symmetric cryptographic operations of a running program, can spec-
ify a monitoring set of valid entry points composed by: EVP EncryptInit ex,
EVP EncryptUpdate ex, and EVP EncryptFinal ex. All these three functions
can be found in the OpenSSL [23] library which is used as the de facto standard
for cryptographic operations.
Another example is the following. Suppose that we want to log all the
write() system calls issued by the text editor vi. In that case, the follow-
ing script is generated by our framework (note that the predefined variable arg0







/execname == "vim" && self->arg1/
{
printf("%Y %s (%d) uid %d write: %s -> %d",





Complex systems, such as web browsers and databases, are composed by a huge
code base. While these systems run, there are many different transitions that can
significantly alter their state. For example, each query processed by a database
can trigger a group of transitions that will drive the database in a completely
new state. It is challenging to identify all valid entry points, which initiate all
these state transitions. A key feature of our framework is that it can greatly
reduce the search space of such points. This is achieved by first instrumenting
all the functions and checking for a specific value that the user has given as
input in the argument list of the monitored system. If found, the name of the
function, the call stack, or both, are logged. Then, the user can decide which
of the collected functions qualify as valid entry points. The subset of functions
narrowed down by our technique is significantly reduced compared to the overall
size of the system in the average case.
Example: We now present a real-world example for a better understanding
of how assisted discovery works. Suppose that we have a new application for
data provenance in a database system. To evaluate its efficiency, we first need to
log all the queries. Normally, we have two options. We can either download the
source of the database and find the appropriate places in the code for logging the
queries, or, we can proxy the inputs (queries) of the database system using an
external software component. The first approach can be very difficult, depending
on the size and complexity of the system, or completely infeasible, in case the
source code is not available. The second one would be difficult to enable/disable
as it would require restarting the database system. In addition, a proxy can
hardly provide any information associated with internal states of the system.
For example, consider a SQL query which is triggered by a user-generated query
and it is initialized and executed internally in the database for optimization
purposes. This query cannot be captured by the external proxy, since it is gener-
ated internally inside the database. On the other hand, our framework can easily
discover the appropriate points for monitoring and logging any information we
need transparently and on demand. This is achieved by instrumenting all the
functions within the database system and search for a special argument value, at
runtime. This argument value should be a query string, like ‘SELECT assisted
FROM discovery;’, and the output of our framework will be a set of function
names that had this character sequence as an argument.
4 Case Studies
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework, we evaluated it in three
scenarios, namely file-system, database and web browser data provenance. The
reason behind choosing these applications is because they have been already
studied in the literature [18, 6, 16]. The case studies are presented in order of
increasing complexity for our framework and, interestingly, the most complex
one revealed some limitations that we consider in Section 5.
4.1 File-system
Data provenance in the context of file-systems was introduced in PASS [18].
To gather provenance information, PASS was implemented in the Linux kernel.
Here, we show how we can gather similar information using our framework,
without having to dig and alter the code of the kernel. We define the set of
system calls that create or change the current state of data, as provenance in a
file-system. This set includes the following systems calls: creat, write, chmod,
chown and unlink. We also include the open system call for completeness. The
output includes a timestamp (indicating the exact moment that the system
entered a system call), the executable’s name, the process id and the user id that
makes the system call. Also, in case that the system call’s arguments contain
useful information, like the location of file, or the file’s permissions, we log this
information too.
An example of the information that is recorded by our framework when a
user edits a file using the TextEdit application on Mac OS X is shown bellow:
2012 Jan 7 23:44:52 TextEdit (23624) uid 501 open: .../paper.txt -> 15
2012 Jan 7 23:44:52 TextEdit (23624) uid 501 write: 15, My paper -> 9
2012 Jan 7 23:44:52 TextEdit (23624) uid 501 close: 15 -> 0
This scenario shows that using the powerful logging capabilities of our frame-
work we can gather system call level information about the file-system by simply
specifying the set of the file-system related system calls, without performing any
changes in the operating system itself.
4.2 Database (SQLite)
The second scenario we consider is in the context of databases and demonstrates
the assisted discovery feature of our framework. Our goal is to locate the appro-
priate point (i.e., function) to log queries in SQLite [1]. Initially, we created a
simple table with a few columns and added some test data. Then, our framework
instrumented all the functions in libsqlite3.dylib4 at runtime.
Then, while assisted discovery was enabled, we performed a few different
types of queries (insertions, deletions, updates, etc.). Each time the given query
string appears in the argument list of an instrumented function, assisted discov-
ery logs it. An example of these logs is the following:
sqlite3 (27426) libsqlite3.dylib:sqlite3_prepare_v2 ’create table ..’
Our framework logged several functions, but, just by looking at their names,
it was obvious that sqlite3 prepare v2 was the most appropriate function to
instrument in order to log all the queries. Then, given the syntax of each SQL
command, we parsed them in order to keep track of any changes made to the
database. Generally, the provenance information about the database entries in-
clude the creation (create) and deletion (drop) of tables and their contents









Fig. 2. The steps extracting provenance information from the SQLite database system
using assisted discovery.
(inserts) with corresponding timestamps. Also, the process name and id com-
bined with the user id are logged for every SQL command that is executed. The
procedure described above is also depicted in Figure 2.
We also calculated the performance overhead of logging provenance informa-
tion using dynamic instrumentation versus logging the same information by al-
tering the source code. We modified the sqlite3 prepare v2 function to record
every SQL query made. Then, we measured the total time needed to perform
one million insert operations in both versions of SQLite, the non-modified but
dynamically instrumented and the modified one. On average, the performance
overhead of dynamic instrumentation in this case was around 0.8%. Thus, for
simple operations, like logging, there is no much difference performance-wise.
4.3 Web browser (Safari)
Another example for applying the idea of provenance is that of the browser. We
treat the notion of data provenance in a browser as it has been proposed in [16].
The main idea is the correlation between a search term and the URL that the
user finally follows from the search engine. In other words, a search term is the
provenance of the URL that the user asks for.
We implement this scenario by tracking the system calls that are called,
such as read, write, send and recv using our framework. Although sufficient
as a proof-of-concept implementation, we have to note that system call level
tracking produces redundant information. It becomes too hard to separate the
useful information for provenance from “noise”. Moreover, the system call level
instrumentation cannot be used when data are encoded, encrypted, etc. Finally,
assisted discovery failed to locate functions, in a higher level than system calls,
where the search keywords and the URLs could be logged. We discuss more
about this in Section 5.
5 Discussion and Future Directions
The last usage scenario, extracting provenance information from a web browser,
revealed some interesting limitations of our framework against very large and
complex systems. These limitations are mostly due to the restricted instrumen-
tation actions of DTrace. Combining a more powerful tool in our framework,
like the dynamic binary instrumentation of Pin [15], seems sufficient to over-
come these limitations, but in some extra cost. Also, tools implemented on top
of Pin, like libdft [12] which provides byte-level data flow tracking, could poten-
tially add more features to our framework.
Although Pin does not come built-in in any operating system, it can be
installed in many of them, like Microsoft Windows, Linux and Mac OS. As
DTrace, Pin can also be used to instrument arbitrary functions and system calls,
but not on demand. The program to be instrumented has to be executed through
Pin. The main advantage of Pin over DTrace though is that there is no limit
in what an instrumentation actions can be. Although that may not seem very
important, there are at least two cases that this feature extends the functionality
of our framework. First off, we can better track the data in the assisted discovery
phase when it is encoded, or encapsulated inside a complex type. As an example,
suppose that we want to track a string value in a large software system that
happens to use a custom string class and we know nothing about its internal
representation. By using Pin during the assisted discovery phase though we can
either convert them to simple character sequences or use any specific compare
function they provide. The second advantage of unconstrained instrumentation
actions is the ability to alter the state and the data of the program.
To better understand and demonstrate the extra functionality that such a
tool adds to our framework, let us consider again the example of implementing
data provenance in a browser. More precisely, suppose that in order to imple-
ment a hypothetical data provenance scheme we want to log all the URLs that
a user navigated to in the Safari web browser. Safari uses the WebKit open
source HTML rendering engine, where URLs are represented by class KURL.
To successfully track a user-input URL during the assisted discovery phase,
the instrumentation action has to compare KURL objects with the input string.
Then, after we locate the appropriate function to instrument in order to log all
the URLs, our framework will convert the KURL object to a simple string and
then log it along with a timestamp, etc.
6 Related Work
Data provenance has been a very active field of research lately, focusing both on
theoretical and practical issues. We discuss below the works most related to our
dynamic data provenance framework.
Most of the recent work has been on data provenance in database systems [4].
Also, more theoretical aspects of the provenance notions (where, why and how)
have been studied [6]. In our work we focus on the practical aspects of data
provenance, on any software application and not simply databases.
The authors of [16] describe how a browser enabled with provenance capa-
bilities can improve user experience. They provide several scenarios for history
search, web search and download management, that a browser with provenance
can offer. In Section 4.3 we show an example of how this kind of data provenance
application could be achieved using our framework, without any modification to
the actual web browser.
Story Book is a system that adds provenance in different systems [21]. It
runs in user space and treats provenance events as a generic event log. It col-
lects application-specific provenance and supports a file system and a database.
PASS [18] supports provenance at the system level and is a layer grafted in a file
system. It gathers provenance for all file activities by inspecting system calls.
Again, an example of how this could be implemented using our framework is
given later on. As an advantage, our approach requires no modifications to the
file system, or any other layer for that matter.
Another system that combines both static and dynamic analysis to trace
provenance is Garm [7]. While our framework is transparent, Garm has to rewrite
the binary when the binary executed. The main advantage of our approach over
Garm’s is that our framework can be applied to any level of the system, capturing
even very high-level information. On the other hand, Garm only operates on low
level data operations.
Recently, the notion of provenance has also been introduced in cloud infras-
tructures [19]. Our framework could be successfully applied in such environments
as well, as it is execution environment agnostic.
Transient provenance [10] keeps information about emigrant data, like files
that were moved, who moved them, and when they were moved, aiming at fa-
cilitating the administrators in case of a leak. The authors propose the creation
of ghost objects so as to be able to record when a file is leaked from the central
system, and moreover by whom, by logging the user ID. This way, after an in-
formation leakage happens, the suspects, the timeline and the objects of leakage
can be reduced up to the people, timestamps and files, recorded by the ghost
objects, giving administrators a valuable hint.
iLeak [11] is a system proposed for detecting inadvertent information leaks.
Although not related to data provenance, iLeak is related to our work as it is
also implemented on top of DTrace. Any sensitive data within a system have
to be initially marked with the appropriate tags. Then, iLeak constantly moni-
tors for their leakage by dynamically instrumenting the system’s communication
channels (sockets, SSL connections, etc.) using DTrace.
7 Conclusion
We designed and implemented a data provenance framework that can be used
for rapid prototyping of any data provenance scheme. Our framework is built on
dynamic instrumentation and provides an easy way to locate the right points to
instrument, as well as a configurable logging component.
Our experience from implementing three real-world examples of data prove-
nance applications, already proposed in the literature, demonstrated the easiness
and practicality of our framework. Moreover, some limitations that were revealed
under very large and complex systems open room for improving our framework
by integrating more powerful dynamic instrumentation tools.
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